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Italy is the main gate of entry for undocumented migration to the 
EU since the EU Turkey statement from March 2016 decreased 
migration to Greece (EPSC 2017). Based on the number of 
recorded apprehensions, the Central Mediterranean route 
has become the most frequented by unauthorised migrants: 
150,000 entries and more were counted annually since 2014. 
Yet, for the two decades before the massive inflow of 2015, 
Italy has already been on the main route for thousands of boat 
migrants (Frontex 2017; Frontex 2010). Persistently, the issue 
ranks high on the agenda of meetings of the European Council 
and the Council of Ministers. According to Italian authorities, the 
amount of entries has seriously and unprecedentedly stressed 
local reception capacity repeatedly motivating Italian Prime 
Ministers to call for EU assistance and burden sharing. The EU 
response to the ‘frontline’ fate of Italy provides resources for 
external migration control in North African countries as well as 
the stepping-up of reception facilities for migrants, especially 
in the southernmost Italian territories. Acknowledging that 
migration management at the Central Mediterranean route 
can only be tackled by a comprehensive or ‘global’ approach, 
this commentary limits itself to an assessment of Italian 
implementation of EU policy and interaction with EU agencies 
in dealing with irregular migration. Secondary movements of 
irregular migrants have challenged the Schengen area to the 
extent that abolishment of these movements has become a 
political priority with EU and national policy makers. Effective 
migration management in Italy, primarily in Sicily, is considered 
a key factor in making the Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS) work and to maintaining the border free Schengen 
area. Even though unauthorised crossings from Libya have 
dropped to a few hundreds due to the increased cooperation 
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between the Italian government and the EU on the one hand, 
and the National Reconciliation Government of Libya State 
and local authorities on the other, there are reasons to believe 
that this arrangement will not last long. The constant violation 
of migrants’ and asylum seekers’ fundamental rights in Libya 
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question the legitimacy of such cooperation and the Libyan 
internal situation remains extremely volatile. This makes it hard 
to predict a stable EU Libya migration cooperation modelled 
after the EU Turkey statement. In addition, migratory routes 
seem to have already shifted westwards with more people now 
departing from Tunisia to land undetected in Lampedusa or the 
rest of Sicily (IOM 2017).
We thus ask whether EU measures can effectively support 
migration management in Italy. Among others, the limitation of 
migrant absconding and onward movements in the Schengen 
area serve as a proxy for achieving EU policy objectives. In 
this regard, we analyse data on the implementation of the 
EU hotspots in Sicily, the relocation mechanism and the 
asylum system in Italy. We also conducted few interviews 
with officials and observers to substantiate the findings. Our 
research shows that the effectiveness of support measures 
is limited also because of issues related to policy design and 
compliance. As a consequence, Italian authorities maintain 
practices circumventing their obligations towards the CEAS. 
This purposeful non-compliance seems to be the political 
trade-off between Italy, EU institutions, and other Member 
States for a Dublin system that puts disproportional strain on 
Italy (ENM 2015; Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi 2014). To us, 
however, this trade-off seems to be unsustainable in the long 
run. The informal management of secondary movements has 
extremely high political costs that risk undermining the whole 
Schengen system. This is why we suggest measures that 
tackle the absconding of irregular migrants in Italy by reducing 
the double burden of Italian authorities in controlling the EU 
external border and providing for asylum seekers’ reception.
EU support measures for ‘frontline’ states
The European Agenda for Migration from 2015 called for 
the better support of ‘frontline’ states in receiving irregular 
migrants and asylum seekers, the systematic identification 
of new arrivals by registration of their biometric data in the 
EURODAC system, and a more evenly distribution of asylum 
seekers among EU Member States (COM 2015 (240)). Until 
late 2015, only a small percentage, roughly one third, of those 
reaching Italy from its shores were properly identified (COM 
2016). Here, non-registration signified the purposeful non-
compliance of various Italian governments with the Dublin 
regulation incentivising secondary movements of irregular 
migrants to other Member States. The establishment of 
so-called ‘hotspots’ in Mediterranean Member States is 
supposed to prevent these practices. Migration management 
support teams that include staff from various EU agencies, the 
European Asylum Support Office (EASO), Frontex, and Europol 
support the Italian law enforcement authorities in dealing 
with first identification and status definition of migrants (COM 
2015 (240): 6). Teams of EU officials are available and work 
in selected disembarking ports. There, many of those rescued 
at sea are landed by state or private carriers according to the 
indications given by ‘the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre 
(MRCC) of Rome, run by the Italian Coast Guard’ (Cuttitta 
2017: 11). The establishment of hotspots and designated 
disembarking ports attempt at combining the humanitarian 
objective of offering first reception with the functions of the 
border, the control of entry and registration of the migrants’ 
identity. In this process, the admissibility of the migrant to 
the asylum procedure or their return to the country of origin is 
determined (Ministero dell’Interno 2017). Overall, hotspots are 
meant to bring order and EU oversight into the management of 
arrivals at the EU external border.
The ill-designed EU relocation mechanism cannot 
undo the failure of Dublin
Italy faces the double burden of controlling the external EU 
border and running asylum procedures in accordance with 
the first country of asylum principle determined in the Dublin 
regulation (604/2013). The establishment of EU hotspots 
aimed at partly taking off this double burden from the 
frontline countries by channelling migrants into a relocation 
mechanism. In fact, this temporary mechanism was a response 
to uneven refugee distribution in the EU and also an effect of 
a Dublin regulation that despite reform efforts does not yet 
include Southern Member States’ call for sharing the burden 
of hosting refugees. The relocation scheme was effective for 
two years, 2015 to 2017, but had serious design problems that 
contradicted the idea of supporting frontline states and the 
hotspot system. To name the most important problem, the 
eligibility for relocation depended on the nationality of the 
migrants and their latest recognition rates for international 
protection in the EU. Only if this rate was above 75 per cent 
the migrant qualified for relocation to another EU member 
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state (Council Decisions (EU) 2015/1523 and 2015/1601, Art. 
3). According to recognition rates from 2017, only Syrians and 
Eritreans were eligible for relocation. In contrast, migrants 
from Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Sudan or Somalia could not be 
considered (Eurostat 2017). The 75 per cent threshold did not 
only limit the application of the relocation mechanism but 
also contradicted the reality that Italian authorities are still 
facing. Most irregular migrants rescued in the Strait of Sicily 
and brought to disembark at one of the ports of the island, 
are of a nationality that does not qualify for relocation. In fact, 
Eritreans, the main nationality qualifying for relocation in Italy, 
only represented 3.6 per cent of all arrivals in December and 
January of 2016-17 (COM 2017 (74): 2). 
An additional major problem of the scheme was the slow 
response of member states to accept relocation. We identify 
non-compliance with the two Council decisions on relocation 
(Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 
and Council Decision 2015/ 1601 of 22 September 2015). 
From roughly 40,000 places allocated for Italy in September 
2015, only 9,754 migrants had been relocated until October 
2017. The implementation of the scheme picked up faster in 
2017 compared to none or slow response in 2016. However, 
some countries openly rejected the scheme or asked for 
exemptions. We find that the hotspot can only function as a 
migration management tool if it is able to channel irregular 
migrants into procedures for asylum, relocation, or return. 
The idea of channelling was blocked by stringent eligibility 
criteria, slow member state response to relocation, and the 
fact that the number of arrivals way exceeds the registration 
and detention capacity of the four Italian hotspots located in 
Pozzallo, Trapani, Lampedusa and Taranto (COM 2017 (74): 9). 
In the first quarter of 2017, more than 35,000 migrants arrived 
in Sicily via the Central Mediterranean route, counting for an 
average of almost 3,000 people per week. Of course, these 
numbers fluctuate and seem to have decreased in the second 
quarter of 2017. However, the hotspots can only receive 1,600 
migrants at a time while registration takes weeks (Dutch 
Council for Refugees 2016). 
Taking the policy design and compliance problems with 
relocation into account, the four operating EU hotspots in 
Sicily and Apulia can hardly deliver on lifting pressure from the 
Italian authorities and de-congest reception facilities in Sicily 
and the rest of Southern Italy. Despite the support that was 
provided by EU agencies as well as EU financial contributions, 
the task of detaining non-admissible asylum seekers, their 
return as well as the obligation to provide for an asylum 
procedure mainly remain the responsibility of Italy (i.e. law 
enforcement authorities and the military). We researched how 
Italy deals with these multiple challenges and how the country 
provides for the asylum procedure and eventual return of 
those that do not receive any international protection in Italy. 
Institutions in Italy ill-functioning
Given the involvement of EU agencies in the registration and 
identification process, Italian authorities are left with little room 
for non-compliance with the Dublin regulation. The Member 
State can hardly shirk its responsibility as the first country 
of asylum for boat people. In fact, the European Parliament 
reports that fingerprinting in Italy has risen to almost 100 per 
cent (EP 2016: 10). Thus, the former practice of purposeful 
non-compliance by non-registration was abolished. However, 
evidence suggests that Italian authorities still aim at limiting 
the number of people entering the national protection system 
by way of issuing deferral of entry orders. 
Corresponding to the opening of the first hotspots in Sicily, 
a significant increase in the number of deferred refusal of 
entry orders was recorded. Such an order is addressed to 
many of those unauthorised migrants apprehended at the 
border who do not apply for asylum. According to Italian law 
enforcement, such orders are issued immediately after rescue 
or disembarkation. Individuals that receive the order to leave 
are not registered nor do they remain in the hotspots since 
the order states that the person had no right to cross the 
border. As a consequence, they are set free with the obligation 
to leave the country within 7 days. Between the 1 September 
2015 and the 13 January 2016, about 18 per cent of the 
4,597 persons that went through the hotspot in Lampedusa 
were given such orders. The Special Commission for the 
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights of the Italian 
Senate expressed its concern for the sudden increase in the 
use of such orders according to a report it had issued in 2017 
(Senato della Repubblica 2017). In a previous report from 
2016, the same Commission stated that, besides increasing 
the rate of registrations the only other tangible result of the 
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establishment of the hotspot system was ‘a substantial 
growth of the number of deferred refusals of entry’ due to few 
relocations (Senato della Repubblica 2016). 
Not only the increase in issuance but also the rapidity with 
which these orders were released generated further concerns, 
to the extent that the practice was denounced as illegal by 
many NGOs, but also by members of the Italian Parliament 
(McMahon 2016; Camera dei Deputati 2016). The organisations 
criticised that asylum applications were assessed collectively, 
based on declared nationality. Both, in Pozzallo and Taranto 
migrants were given these orders even before they could 
apply for asylum and before they received adequate legal 
assistance. A report of the Italian Parliament links the increase 
in the issuing of such orders explicitly to recently introduced 
‘directives issued by the Italian Ministry of Interior’ (Camera 
dei Deputati 2015). For this reason, the Department of Civil 
Liberties of the Italian Ministry of the Interior had to reprimand 
the Italian police with an internal memo calling for a limit on 
the use of such orders and treating all asylum applications on 
an individual basis (Consiglio Italiano per i Rifugiati 2016). 
The rapid increase in deferred refusal of entry orders has 
several explanations. Among other factors, by issuing deferred 
refusal of entry orders, Italian authorities are able to keep 
many unregistered and out of the Italian reception system – 
thus decreasing the burden on reception. In fact, those who 
did not receive a deferred refusal of entry order will enter the 
Italian reception system either as asylum seekers or, in case no 
application for asylum is submitted, simply as undocumented 
migrants. As for undocumented migrants and those whose 
asylum application is rejected, they will enter detention until 
they receive an expulsion order. 
It is important to note that few of those that receive the 
deferred refusal of entry order and almost none of those with 
an expulsion order actually leave Italy and the EU: rather, the 
opposite happens. When receiving deferred refusal of entry or 
expulsion orders, people are simply left free to move around 
in Italy with the obligation to leave the territory of the country 
within 7 days (Debarge 2016). Hardly anybody takes a boat or 
a flight back to Libya or their country of origin, many simply 
remain within the Schengen territory and try to move north. 
This explains why so many unauthorised migrants keep 
crowding the Italian border areas of Brennero or Ventimiglia, 
waiting to cross into Austria and France (Statewatch 
Observatory 2016). Another indicator for the ill-functioning 
of the asylum system in Italy is the exponential development 
of requests for Dublin transfers. In 2016 Italy received by far 
most ‘take charge’ and ‘take back’ requests (64,844) of asylum 
seekers apprehended in other Member States. Two thirds of 
these requests were justified as take back requests. A take 
back request means that the asylum claim of the migrant is 
still under investigation or has been rejected in the country of 
first entry. Requests addressed to Italy rose by 1,460 per cent 
comparing the number of requests from 2008 (4,447) to 2016 
(64,844) (Datamarket 2017). 
This data clearly shows that today the Italian asylum system 
cannot cope with the amount of people seeking protection 
in the country, let alone those entering for other reasons 
than international protection. The data also raises concerns 
about the applicability of the Dublin regulation at a time when 
Italy has limited incentives and means to comply with EU 
obligations. A situation that has certainly not improved with 
the recent reform of the asylum reception system introduced 
by the Italian Minister of Interior Marco Minniti, in April 2017. 
In fact the change in legislation introduced cutting the time 
foreseen to examine asylum requests and the right to legal 
assistance in appealing decisions (Virgo 2017). Arguably, this 
will increase the number of rejected applications, with even 
more individuals receiving an order of expulsion that will not 
be executed.
Concluding recommendations
Summing up the analysis of implementation of EU hotspots 
and the asylum system in Italy we conclude that the country 
maintains shirking its obligations towards Dublin and the 
CEAS. Our tentative explanation for this account is that an ill-
designed relocation mechanism cannot rectify the problems 
and failure of the Dublin regulation. If relocation does not 
function it negatively impacts on the idea of the hotspot to 
orderly manage mixed migration flows at the EU external 
border. Our assumption is that frontline Member States will 
do anything they can to promote burden sharing by shirking 
their responsibility towards the CEAS, as long as responsibility 
for providing international protection is not shared. As 
such, the CEAS is incomplete and persistently bound to 
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fail. Our suggestion for a policy response to the dilemma of 
responsibility shirking is twofold. On the one hand, we propose 
to invest in the Italian asylum infrastructure. On the other hand, 
we suggest other Member States that can barely agree on 
reforming Dublin to at least apply the regulation in a ‘spirit of 
solidarity’. Both ways, incentives for shirking responsibilities 
could be suppressed.
The Italian reception system has been reformed several 
times, most recently in April 2017 (COM 2017 (1882)). In 
general, asylum seekers go through a 3-tier reception system, 
as reception provides for (1) first assistance facilities (so 
called CPSA) and hotspots; (2) reception facilities including 
first reception centres (the so called CIE, now CPR), CARAs 
(centres for the accommodation of asylum seekers) and 
CAS (temporary centres for emergency reception) now both 
incorporated into regional hubs; and (3) second-tier reception 
facilities, so-called SPRAR centres (System of Protection for 
Applicants and Beneficiaries of International Protection) that 
are run by the National Association of Italian Municipalities. 
While CPSA and hotspots are present in border areas to 
provide for the first reception and registration of unauthorised 
migrants and asylum seekers apprehended at the border, CPR 
and regional hubs exist primarily to detain undocumented 
third-country nationals who have been caught within the Italian 
territory. These CPRs are also the places where unauthorised 
migrants are transferred to after they have left the hotspots 
or the disembarking ports, and before receiving an order of 
expulsion. Similarly, CARAs serve to host asylum seekers 
waiting for their application to be evaluated. If successful, 
they enter the SPRAR system based on local and relatively 
small facilities (EP 2015). 
Thus we recommend for the EU to invest in better reception 
facilities in Italy by concentrating the effort on the SPRAR 
system. As recorded by many stakeholders (e.g. COM 2015), 
such a localised approach constitutes a good practice, 
especially if compared to the CARA system that is instead 
composed mainly of big centres whose establishment 
and management has often created tensions with local 
communities (FRA 2016). Moreover, given the size of CARAs 
and the available public funding, ‘the mafia infiltrated [their] 
administration’ (Goffredo and Meret 2017) significantly 
decreasing the quality of services provided to detainees. 
On the contrary, in the SPRAR smaller groups of asylum 
seekers are accommodated in ‘small facilities scattered 
on the territory and organised in medium-sized collective 
centres or apartments, which sometimes are self-managed’ 
(EMN 2013). There, due to the reduced size of the facilities, 
asylum seekers can better and more easily integrate in local 
communities. Thus, while on the one hand the SPRAR system 
helps reducing the social costs of asylum, on the other this 
model might also help avoiding the mismanagement of public 
funding. Investing in the SPRAR system while also providing 
material support for migrants, and swifter processing of 
applications, can de-incentivise refugees from trying to move 
elsewhere in Europe as secondary movements would become 
less attractive in comparative terms. However, in order to 
de-incentivise Italian authorities’ from circumventing their 
Dublin obligations anyway, the Italian asylum system must be 
upgraded while simultaneously pushing for a more efficient 
relocation system that could be part of the currently negotiated 
Dublin IV regulation. Despite contention and disagreement on 
mandatory relocation in the Council of the EU, a coalition of 
the ‘willing’ could spearhead putting solidarity into practice. As 
the situation in ‘frontline’ Member States constantly changes 
a flexible approach should be key to these efforts.  
These positive incentives can be supported by other Member 
States’ mindful management of Dublin transfers as long as 
the situation affords it and Italians build up capacity. What 
we mean by mindful is a unilateral or bilateral, temporary and 
selective suspension of Dublin transfers to Italy that can be an 
alternative to mandatory relocation. In this regard, we follow 
the suggestion of recent jurisdiction of the Court of Justice 
(C 490/16 and C 646/16) (Court of Justice of the European 
Union 2017). The Court’s decision reaffirms Member States’ 
obligations under the Dublin regulation. At the same time it 
suggests that the rules can be applied in a ‘spirit of solidarity’ 
if Member States evoke the ‘sovereignty clause’ (Art. 17(1), 
Regulation 604/2013). This clause determines that Dublin 
transfers are not mandatory and Member States may decide 
to examine a claim for international protection even if this is 
not their responsibility under the Regulation. Along these lines, 
Italy has already shown resistance to accepting take back 
requests. As such, the country acts against Dublin pushing 
for the sovereignty clause to be enforced by other Member 
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States. Nevertheless, we hold that incentives created for 
onward movements of irregular migrants can be toned down 
by the select and temporary suspension of Dublin transfers, 
if simultaneously efforts are made to build better reception 
facilities in Italy. This seemingly contradictory approach 
could substitute for ill-functioning or non-existent relocation 
and create incentives for Italian authorities to improve their 
reception infrastructure while abstaining from excessively 
issuing deferred refusal of entry orders.  
References
Camera dei Deputati (2016) Interpellanza urgente n. 2-01354 dell’On. 
Donatella Duranti ed altri sulla situazione degli hotspot presenti 
sul territorio italiano, nel quadro delle politiche di accoglienza dei 
migranti, available at: http://aic.camera.it/aic/scheda.html?numero=2-
01354&ramo=C&leg=17
Camera dei Deputati (2015) XVII LEGISLATURA - Allegato B - Seduta 
di Martedì 22 dicembre 2015, available at: http://www.camera.it/leg
17/410?idSeduta=0542&tipo=atti_indirizzo_controllo&pag=allegato_b
#si.7-00876 
COM (2015) European best practice in outreach educational counselling 
and low-threshold learning opportunities for disadvantaged learners, 
available at: http://www.onthemove-project.eu/onthemove_en.pdf 
COM 2015 (240) Communication from the Commission of the 
European Union. A European Agenda on Migration, Brussels, 13 May 
2015.
COM (2016) Implementing the European Agenda on Migration: 
Commission reports on progress in Greece, Italy and the Western 
Balkans, Press Release IP/16/269, 10 February 2016, available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-269_en.htm. 
COM 2017 (1882) Press Release - Central Mediterranean Route: 
Commission proposes Action Plan to support Italy, reduce pressure 
and increase solidarity, 4 July 2017, available at: http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-17-1882_en.htm 
COM 2017 (74) Report from the Commission of the European Union. 
Ninth Report on Relocation and Resettlement, 8 February 2017.
Consiglio Italiano per i Rifugiati (C.I.R.) onlus (2016) Ministero 
dell’Interno, Dipartimento per le Libertà Civili e L’immigrazione, 
available at: https://www.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/
Circolare-2255-del-30.10.15.pdf 
Court of Justice of the European Union (2017) Press Release 86/17, 26 
July 2017, Luxembourg
Cuttitta, P. (2017) ‘Repoliticization Through Search and Rescue? 
Humanitarian NGOs and Migration Management in the Central 
Mediterranean’, Geopolitics, available at: http://www.tandfonline.
com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14650045.2017.1344834?needAccess=true 
Datamarket (2017) Incoming ‘Dublin’ requests by submitting country 
(PARTNER), type of request and legal provision, available at: https://
datamarket.com/data/set/46q4/incoming-dublin-requests-by-
submitting-country-partner-type-of-request-and-legal-provision#!ds=4
6q4!71e4=b:71e6=u:71e8=g.y:a40t=1.n&display=line
Debarge, C. (2016) ‘How Italy’s flawed hots pots are creating thousands 
of “clandestini”’, IRIN The inside story of emergencies,  available at: http://
www.irinnews.org/news/2016/04/13/how-italy%E2%80%99s-flawed-
hotspots-are-creating-thousands-%E2%80%9Cclandestini%E2%80%9D 
Dutch Council for Refugees (2016) The implementation of the 
hotspots in Italy and Greece. A study, available at: https://www.ecre.
org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/HOTSPOTS-Report-5.12.2016..pdf 
EMN (2015) A study on smuggling of migrants. Characteristics, 
responses and cooperation with third countries, available at: http://
www.emn.lv/wp-content/uploads/study_on_smuggling_of_migrants_
final_report_master_091115_final_pdf.pdf 
EMN (2013) Focused Study: The Organisation of Reception Facilities 
for Asylum Seekers in different Member States, available at: https://
ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-
studies/14a.italy_national_report_reception_facilities_en_version_
en.pdf
EP (2016) On the frontline: the hotspot approach to managing 
migration. Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department 
C, Study PE 556.942, European Parliament: Brussels
EP (2015) Work and social welfare for asylum-seekers and refugees. 
Selected EU Member States, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/572784/EPRS_IDA(2015)572784_
EN.pdf 
EPSC (2017) Irregular Migration via the Central Mediterranean. From 
Emergency Responses to Systemic Solutions, European Political 
Strategy Centre, Issue 22, Brussels.
Eurostat (2017) First instance decisions by outcome and recognition 
rates, 30 main citizenships of asylum applicants granted decisions in 
the EU-28, 1st quarter 2017, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
statistics-explained/index.php/File:First_instance_decisions_by_
outcome_and_recognition_rates,_30_main_citizenships_of_asylum_
applicants_granted_decisions_in_the_EU-28,_1st_quarter_2017.png 
FRA (2016) Monthly data collection on the current migration situation 
in the EU, July 2016 monthly report 1–30 June 2016, available at: 
http://fra.europa.eu/en/theme/asylum-migration-borders/overviews/
july-2016 
Frontex (2017) Central Mediterranean Route, available at: http://
frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/central-mediterranean-route/ 
Frontex (2010) Extract from the Annual Risk Analysis 2010, available at: 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_
Risk_Analysis_2010.pdf 
Goffredo, S. Meret, M. (2017) Stuck in Place: Confinement and Survival 
in Borgo Mezzanone, Border Criminologies Blog, available at: https://
www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/
centreborder-criminologies/blog/2017/06/stuck-place 
IOM (2017) Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals Reach 140,538 in 
2017; Deaths Reach 2,754, available at: https://www.iom.int/
news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-reach-140538-2017-deaths-
reach-2754 
McMahon, S. (2016) Border Control and the Precarious Lives of 
Migrants in Italy, Border Criminologies Blog, available at: https://
www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/
centreborder-criminologies/blog/2016/12/border-control 
Ministero dell’Interno (2017) Standard Operating Procedures Hotspots 
2017, available at: http://www.libertaciviliimmigrazione.dlci.interno.
gov.it/sites/default/files/allegati/hotspots_sops_-_english_version.
pdf 
Senato della Repubblica (2017) Rapporto sui Centri di identificazione 
ed espulsione - gennaio 2017, available at: https://www.senato.
it/application/xmanager/projects/leg17/file/Cie%20rapporto%20
aggiornato%20(2%20gennaio%202017).pdf 
7                 Policy   brief • n° 2017/03
Senato della Repubblica (2016) Rapporto sui Centri di identificazione 
ed espulsione, available at: https://www.senato.it/application/
xman ag er/p ro jects/ leg 17/ f i l e / rep o s i to r y/co mmiss io n i /
dirittiumaniXVII/rapporto_cie.pdf
Statewatch Observatory (2016) The refugee crisis in the Med and 
inside the EU: a humanitarian emergency, available at: http://
statewatch.org/eu-med-crisis-2016-04-06-apr-jun.htm 
Triandafyllidou, A. Dimitriadi, A. (2014) Governing Irregular Migration 
and Asylum at the Borders of Europe: Between Efficiency and 
Protection, available at: http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/
ImaginingEurope_06.pdf 
Virgo, P. (2017) Minniti migrants decree wins final approval in Italy’s 
House, ANSA, available at: http://www6.ansa.it/ansamed/en/news/
sections/politics/2017/04/12/minniti-migrants-decree-wins-final-
approval_11522083-fd28-4d43-ab71-23c6f2958657.html 
Acknowledgements
We thank our sources from Italy and beyond for providing us with extremely valuable insights and the IES Migration and Diversity 
cluster for supporting this publication. We are grateful for the comments of Philipp Stutz, and inspiration from Florian Trauner. 
Policy   brief • n° 2017/03
About the authors
With a focus on the most empirical outcomes of European integration, Dr. Giacomo Orsini has conducted much 
fieldwork research along the European external border in Melilla, Malta, Lampedusa and Fuerteventura, and is 
now working as Senior Research Officer of the Department of Sociology of the University of Essex for the ESRC 
funded project ‘Bordering on Britishness: an Oral History Study of 20th century Gibraltar’. Since 2015 he also works 
as Maître de Conference of the Institut d’Etudes Européennes of the Université Libre de Bruxelles, where he teaches 
the postgraduate course ‘International Migrations in Europe’. In 2017 he became Associate Researcher of the 
Institute for European Studies of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. His major research areas are concerned with borders 
– being them real or symbolic, migration and asylum, contemporary governance systems and governmentality, 
maritime sociology and the sociology of everyday life. During his academic career, he has collaborated with 
several European as well as non-European universities, and became member of various international research 
networks. In 2011 he was awarded the prestigious GUF-100 Prize as the Student of the Year of the Faculty of Arts 
of the University of Groningen. Later that year, he also received the University of Essex’s studentship to conduct 
his doctoral research there.
Prof. Dr. Christof Roos recently joined the University of Flensburg as an Assistant Professor for European and Global 
Governance. He stays an associate researcher at IES and its Migration and Diversity Cluster in which he worked from 
2014 to 2017. At University of Bremen and its International Graduate School for Social Sciences he received his PhD 
in 2012 where he researched EU integration in Justice and Home Affairs. His focus is on EU immigration politics as well 
as single market issues such as freedom of movement, Schengen cooperation, and the common European asylum 
system. Contributions include: In Cracks in the Walls of Fortress Europe? The EU and Immigration Policies (2013) 
with Palgrave Macmillan as well as the co-authored monograph Liberal States and the Freedom of Movement. 
Selective Borders, Unequal Mobility (2012). He studied political science at Free University Berlin (2000-2006) and at 
York University Toronto (2003-2004). He currently teaches in the European Studies programme of Flensburg University 
and gives lectures on EU migration, asylum, and border policies at the Collège of Europe (Bruges). 
Outside of academia Christof Roos worked for the European Commission’s DG Joint Research Centre in Ispra (Italy). 
There he contributed to a study on emigration from West African countries (2006-2007). In 2013 and 2014 he worked 
on the European strategy on Roma Inclusion and on the European Smart Cities and Communities Initiative in the 
European Affairs Department of the Senate Chancellery of the city of Berlin.
 Policy briefs are published by the Institute for European Studies • Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel
www.ies.be • Pleinlaan 5, B-1050 Brussels • T +32 2 614 80 01 • info@ies.be
